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Many people see local control and place-based collaboration as
the next wave in managing natural resources that fall on private
property in the western United States. Recent books by Wondolleck and
Yaffee, Sabel et al., and Brick, Snow, and Van De Wetering (2001), among
others, illustrate this view on how to use collaboration to protect critical
habitat and open spaces that rest in private hands. These collaborative
processes encourage local stakeholders to resolve disputes on private
and public lands through bargaining and negotiation, rather than
through litigation or federal mandate. Devolution of regulation allows
communities to try and develop and enforce consensus management
plans that adopt specific place-based strategies complementing federal
legislation. In principle, such collaboration offers the potential for an
efficient Coasean bargaining-type construction of local development and
protection of natural resources in which private property rights exist.
* Shogren is the Stroock Distinguished Professor of Natural Resource Conservation
and Management and professor of economics at the University of Wyoming.
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Collaboration groups trying to capture these potential gains from
exchange now number in the hundreds in the west, ranging from
informal grassroots meetings to government-mandated advisory
councils.
Local control and place-based collaboration for private property
questions is also being promoted at the federal and state levels. At the
federal level, Congress enacted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
1990, which moved environmental protection activities away from
relying on the federal agencies to a more balanced approach to engage
local citizen groups. The implication is that Congress found these
alternative means of dispute resolution to produce faster, cheaper,
friendlier decisions than existing dispute resolution procedures such as
litigation. This legislation authorized and encouraged federal agencies to
use alternative dispute resolution techniques for the prompt and infor-
mal resolution of disputes and recognized the benefits of negotiation.
At the state level, more local control and collaboration is
reflected in the Western Governors Association's environmental doctrine
called Enlibra. The first and second Enlibra principles are "national
standards, neighborhood solutions-assign responsibilities at the right
level"; and "collaboration, not polarization-use collaborative processes
to break down barriers and find solutions." The idea behind these
principles is that locals who own or use the land also understand local
conditions, including landowners, local resource organizations, and state
or local governments. The federal government is asked to help locals
develop their own plans to define, implement, and enforce accountable
targets of conservation.
Several reasons explain why collaboration has worked to help
promote effective solutions at a local level on both private and public
lands. Collaboration reduces the risk that local net benefits will be
downplayed relative to national concerns, encouraging local support for
the final decision. Locals included in a decision to make a local change
are more likely to support or at least understand the suggested policy.
Collaboration can also take a broader perspective by promoting
cooperation across the fence lines of private landowners. Collaboration
tries to signal respect for indigenous and anecdotal knowledge that
exists in the people most familiar with specific problems and tries to
promote information sharing between people who might not necessarily
trust each other's motives.
In his book This Sovereign Land, Dan Kemmis has taken the idea
of local control in the interior west to an extreme. Kemmis, the director
of the Center of the Rocky Mountain West at the University of Montana,
defines his vision on how local control might actually be codified into a
larger and more formal institutional structure. He argues that perhaps
the time is right for the west to govern the west. He contends that the
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Mountain West could recapture its democratic roots through authentic
self-determination similar to the semi-autonomous relationship that
Scotland and Wales have with the United Kingdom. He calls for a
"progressive, bipartisan, regional solidarity among western governors
and within the Senate.. .for a West-wide compact to transfer
responsibility for public lands to western institutions" (Kemmis, p. 231).
This ambitious vision most likely will appeal to many westerners,
especially those who support the Western Governors' ideal of Enlibra.
Essentially, such an extreme form of local control would give a
lot more final authority over natural resource use to westerners. But
whether such a powerful final authority should or could be allowed
depends on whom you ask. Some people believe it is a necessary
condition for more effective local control and collaboration. They fear
that stakeholders take their negotiation duties lightly if they think their
recommendations are advisory rather than binding. Former EPA
Administrator William Ruckelshaus, for example, is a prominent
supporter of final authority. He stressed, "it is best if the relevant
governmental authority signals in unambiguous terms... that what
comes out of the [collaborative] process will likely prevail as public
policy." U.S. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, for whatever motive,
also recently promoted final decision-making authority on locals. He
added an amendment to legislation that gave final authority through
force of law to a consensus agreement struck between the U.S. Forest
Service, the logging industry, and two major environmental groups to
allow thinning in the Black Hills National Forest. Daschle's amendment
maintains final authority for the agreement by shielding it from any
future appeal or legal challenge.
A well-known example of final authority is the Quincy Library
Group's forest management plan. The Quincy Library Group is a local
collaborative group in northern California that asked for final authority
for a five-year forest-management experiment developed by their
coalition. They sought support for their plan on the national political
arena after the Forest Service failed to adopt key aspects of the plan. The
forests in their plan were the Plumas, Lassen, and Tahoe National
Forests in northeastern California. Despite the efforts of national
environmental groups like the Wilderness Society, the Quincy group
eventually was successful. Congress passed the plan by a 429-1 vote,
President Clinton signed it into law in 1998, and since then they have
received nearly $25 million in federal funds to help implement their
plan. The Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act
was signed into law in 1998 and authorizes a five-year pilot project
mandating the U.S. Forest Service to manage the three national forests
under the plan developed by the Quincy Library Group.
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Others disagree. While noting that collaboration makes sense in
theory, they argue that final authority by local groups does not. Michael
McCloskey, former executive director and chairman of the Sierra Club,
makes the point that delegating final authority "would effect a massive
transfer of power, a repudiation of the progress of the past century, a
collapse in environmental gains, and a grievous wound to the practice of
democracy." They fear both local vested interests and outside industries
will dominate ordinary citizens in negotiations, leading to either no
agreements or to binding, watered-down agreements that promote status
quo wealth preservation.
In his book Pushed off the Mountain, Sold down the River:
Wyoming's Search for Its Soul, Samuel Western makes this point about
Wyoming. He argues that local control in Wyoming has turned into an
issue of wealth preservation versus wealth creation. Western focuses in
on Wyoming but his points apply more broadly. He identifies two myths
about final authority and local control: Wyoming could prosper if the
federal government would only let us, but we cannot live peaceably with
the federal government and keep our sense of honor. Western argues
that the best solution is for locals to find the cure for Wyoming
Alzheimer's (we forget everything but the grudges) and then look
inward and accept outside competition as a way of life. He thinks locals
should see Wyoming and its resources as in the center of the nation, not
a century-old throwback priding itself on "Wyoming, the way the West
was.,,
Consensus through local control might work in some cases; it
might not in others. If final authority cannot be guaranteed and private
landowners see the collaboration process as a risky venture, a different
commitment device is needed to make an agreement stick-and that tool
might just be compensation. In the 1930s, for instance, Aldo Leopold
pointed out that conservation "ultimately boil[s] down to reward the
private landowner who conserves the public interest." The relevant
Western Governors' Enlibra principal is that collaboration works better
with incentives: "markets before mandates-pursue economic incentives
whenever appropriate." The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002 is another example. Title II of the Farm Bill budgeted $17 billion for
incentives for conservation on agricultural lands, including the newly
created Conservation Security Program (CSP). The CSP pays producers
who adopt and maintain conservation practices on private lands.
Contracts run from five-to-ten years, and annual payments range from
$20,000 to $45,000, with an extra "Secretary's" bonus to encourage people
to sign on.
While the call for compensation is not new, it still remains
controversial. Compensation for private landowners in local
collaboration has its critics and supporters from both side of the fence.
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Landowners who are wary of compensation-for-collaboration see the
funds as a wedge that could be used to further open the door for more
federal control over their property. Conservationists who oppose
compensation see it as unable to fulfill targeted conservation goals such
as creating larger habitat reserves and as a backdoor way to sabotage
resource policy through federal under-funding. There is also the
romantic, conservation ethic mindset toward land conservation
promoted by people like Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Thoreau, and
John Muir. These preservationists believed land had other uses than just
for human financial gain. Landowners are free to pursue private profits
provided they behave as responsible social citizens too, because by
definition land is already in public service. Land uses should be viewed
as "harm-preventing" rather than as "public good providing."
Conservationists who support compensation see it as a practical
way to buy cooperation. Landowner proponents argue that it is only fair
to compensate property owners who are restricted in their ability to
protect their investment. They view laws that restrict their autonomy to
protect obscure nature as a threat to both the economic system and
broader social order (see for example Epstein). They view land as capital,
and believe capital is the key ingredient that allows people the ability to
create, store, and share the wealth necessary for national prosperity.
These landowners believe their land ethic is valid and would like their
ongoing stewardship appreciated. This classical liberal viewpoint takes a
Hamiltonian perspective-the government should abdicate to market
forces that create wealth by allowing for resources to move freely from
low valued to high valued uses. Rightly or wrongly, they fear that
restricting private land for species protection without just compensation
is another step down a slippery slope toward collectivism.
But getting the cooperation of private landowners is vital to the
protection of natural resources in the west. About half of the listed
endangered species have eighty percent of their habitat on private land.
The question is to find a tool that would respect landowner privacy,
acknowledge their prior stewardship efforts, and allow some flexibility
in how they protect their investments. One tool that might bring both
sides together could be to create an explicit bioeconomic market for
critical habitat that goes beyond collaboration and compensation. Formal
markets allow for both collaboration and privacy. A market exchange
still implies consensus. Landowners can be provided the opportunity to
sell private shares of critical habitat rights on the open market without
opening themselves up to public access. Some observers discount
market-based solutions because they require too much information, and
too much flexibility with too little information is dangerous.
But markets respect privacy and can help overcome major
constraints facing consensus. Markets can accommodate where
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consensus fails-specifically a landowner's desire to keep private what
has been private for years. Collaborative efforts face a real constraint if
explicit consensus is required, but a market can work. Markets protect a
landowner's desire to keep private what has been private for years. A
shared feature of most models of consensus building is to even out
power imbalances by "sharing information." But landowners who do not
want to share information for whatever reason have little incentive to sit
down and cooperate at the bargaining table.
In their classic and recently revised book Free Market
Environmentalism, Anderson and Leal point out that such markets are
used around the globe and are being proposed for use in climate change
as a cost-effective mechanism to get more protection at lower cost. But
how would this market be constructed? Similar to the real estate market,
private-sector bio-economic appraisers would assess the biological
quality of the critical habitat rights offered up for sale. The appraiser
would certify the habitat as four-star, three-star, etc. quality. Sellers
would then post their offer to sell a given habitat right for a given price
subject to private appraisal. Negotiating fair market value for habitat
rights will require independent and confidential biological/economic
appraisals of habitat. Duration of the contract would be negotiated.
Inspections and non-performance could be standard rules or open for
discussion. Most importantly, information that was not essential for the
public enforcement of the transaction would remain confidential.
There will be challenges. Finding landowners willing to sell
habitat rights will be a task. Deciding where and how money should be
spent to get the biggest ecological bang for the buck will take energy.
Conservation contracts will have to be well specified because property
rights are often complicated, especially for water rights. Determining
which acquisition option is best for the circumstances-lease, purchase,
or donation-must be thought through.
And what might a private-land bioapprasial look like? An
example of a bioapprasial process requires one to describe and document
land characteristics and attributes that affect the conservation value of
the land, including a description of the property and the types and
frequencies of habitat and species, how the land parcel's habitat relates
to the habitat on surrounding properties, and the extent that habitat
quality and species viability can be enhanced through active
management. Like real estate appraisals, property owners could initiate
bioappraisals and conduct them under a contract. The bioappraisal
process would have to establish a common language, a species- and
region-specific certification process, and a professional association for
which standards and information can be transferred and defined by
contract law. An effective bioapprasial would include a description of
the property and resources of interest; the spatial context to understand
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whether the populations and habitats on the property are contiguous
with larger ones or isolated; the potential species and habitats; the actual
species and habitats, including diversity, distribution, and abundance;
and the carrying capacity and non-habitat factors like predators, prey,
competitors, and disease-causing organisms. The open political economy
question is whether the agricultural community would or could open up
their value assessment surveys to include questions aimed at bio-
assessment.
Healthy local control through collaboration in exchange for
stricter accountability is a trade-off many westerners might make. More
formal bio-economic markets for better natural resource conservation is
not a pie-in-the-sky idea. Such a market would complement or replace
already existing programs that use a bilateral negotiation landowner-by-
landowner approach. The search for who and how to control western
natural resources on public and private lands requires that we use the
best tool for the task at hand. There is no universally preferred tool.
Sometimes consensus works, but other times compensation through
explicit bioeconomic markets can work better, especially when voluntary
actions and privacy are issues. You might not want to go this far, but as
the prominent PBS commentator Bill Moyers recently pointed out, "If
you want to fight for the environment, don't hug a tree; hug an
economist."
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International Law and the Environment: Variations on a Theme. By
Tuomas Kuokkanen. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002. Pp.
xxxiii, 412, Index. $124.00 hardcover.
International law has over the last century or so struggled with
issues relating to the protection of the environment and the utilization of
natural resources, seeking to develop functional methods and techniques
to solve various problems that have arisen in these fields. Although the
efforts of countries and international institutions in the law-making
arena have been continual, the solutions have not always been prompt
and easy, in particular for two reasons. First, due to the nature of
international law itself, which, as a dynamic institution, is subjected to
perennial change. Second, due to the subject matter-environment-
itself, which, because of its inherently transcendent nature, triggers
continually renewed demand for change of regime. The rapid scientific
and technological development continues to further delay resolutions on
the matter. Indeed there is little reason for doubt that the planet is
undergoing significant change of environment that requires continuous
regime adjustments. Also consequently, environmental law has become
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